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Towards a Literary Public Sphere: the Mercurio Peruano, Lima, 1791 
This article examines the applicability of Habermas’ concept of the public sphere 
to the periodical paper the Mercurio Peruano in 1791. It compares the conditions 
of production of Habermas’ ‘model’ eighteenth-century European bourgeois 
public sphere to those of a colonial, ancien régime Lima complete with 
Inquisition censorship. It suggests that Habermas’ literary—rather than 
political—public sphere, training ground for a critical civic public reflection, is 
the more fruitful concept. Moving beyond contextualist explanations, it argues 
that the Mercurio’s Enlightenment meditations on the capital’s ‘civil system’—
on its commerce and its cafés—construct the public sphere through and in the 
productive force of critical reason itself. In its patriotic pages we glimpse both the 
signs of a ‘modern’ public sphere of civil society in the interstices of formal 
politics before independence and a reminder that the public sphere, based on a 
reason that exceeds any determinate historical structure, is never exclusively 
modern. 
 
Keywords: public sphere; Mercurio Peruano; Enlightenment.  
 
Word count:  7299 
 
Does the publication of the Mercurio Peruano help ‘configure’ something like a ‘public 
sphere’ in Lima, 1791?1 Given the persistence of the old hierarchies of the Catholic 
monarchy and the heightened ethnic divisions following the Tupac Amaru rebellion of 
the early 1780s, it would appear unlikely that a largely elite-creole periodical paper had 
‘consolidated’ a public sphere, where the latter is taken to be synonymous with an 
egalitarian associationism.2 Hierarchy and social exclusion pervade the Viceroyalty of 
La Plata at the end of the eighteenth century. 
The category of the public sphere does not, of course, come from Lima, 1791. 
Even if it is not absolutely Habermasian, the category of the public sphere is 
unavoidably Habermasian, since it was Jürgen Habermas who, in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, bequeathed the most decisive historico-theoretical 
account of what he called Öffentlichkeit (public, state of being public, publicness, public 
life, public sphere). Receiving this Habermasian legacy (a legacy is always a complex 
inheritance that remains to be deciphered and sifted) entails, at the very least, a double 
risk. First, the risk of imagining that there was only ever one species of public sphere 
and that that species was, in its essence, bourgeois, European, emancipatory and 
rationalist. Taken thus, the idea of the public sphere would be one more negative verdict 
on a Latin America always judged to be lacking someone else’s history (your public 
sphere wasn’t very well developed, was it?). In fact, the public sphere ‘blueprint’, to use 
a word from the translation of Habermas’ book, is itself not so certain. Habermas 
conceded that the ‘bourgeois’ public sphere was permeated by demands from below, 
outlined three different variants of the European public sphere, and has been criticised 
for exaggerating its emancipatory potential and failing to address the question of 
religion—this last, vital for any consideration of colonial Spanish America.3 Indeed, it is 
worth remembering that The Structural Transformation is a lament for a European lack. 
The whole of the second half of the book is a lament for a properly critical public sphere 
which, he believes (in 1961), Europe no longer has (Europe’s public sphere has been 
taken over by the mass media and is thus no public sphere to speak of). Alongside any 
question of the adequacy of the Habermasian category of the public sphere to late 
colonial Lima, therefore, is the question of its adequacy to Europe. Europe, Habermas 
intimates, lacks its own history. 
The second risk is that of imagining that there could be an alternative 
configuration of something approaching a public sphere which shared none of the 
material or symbolic DNA of the Habermasian species. Let us emancipate ourselves 
from other (categories of) public spheres, identify our own public sphere—Catholic, 
Hispanic, colonial, non-bourgeois, autochthonous even... It is as if Latin America did 
not have irreducible political, economic, conceptual and ethical complicities with the 
categories of the European tradition and the social configuration that inspired those 
categories (see Habermas 1999, xvii). 
Without reducing either risk, I shall suggest in what follows that a deal between 
the two can be brokered by foregrounding, not Habermas’ political public sphere 
(which, by 1791, almost no country in the world had), but his more properly eighteenth-
century literary public sphere. This category is tied to a certain European social and 
intellectual configuration. But the category exceeds Europe, much as the phenomena it 
names (commercial networks, the nation-state, thinking) are not exclusive to Europe but 
rather are shared, with important colonial differences, by the Indies. In Habermas’ 
Marxist view, these phenomena amount to the political, economic, social and cultural 
conditions of production which determine the cultural product. His public sphere is one 
such generative matrix, producing Enlightenment. Habermas’ key point is that this 
generative matrix is itself produced. Over many centuries the public sphere is produced 
by political, economic, social and cultural mutations. However, it will not be enough to 
explore the possible configuration of a colonial public sphere by turning to so-called 
material conditions of production without stopping to think that the cultural product 
itself helps produce the conditions of production. As though thinking were no kind of 
productive material. Habermas’ ‘sociology’ of the public sphere itself risks 
downplaying one of his central claims, namely, that the public sphere consists in the 
public use of critical reason by private individuals. What if, then, the Mercurio Peruano 
were an instance, not of the consolidation of a public sphere, but of the power of 
(divided) critical reason to produce the conditions of and for an uncertain colonial 
public sphere? 
Habermas’ legacy 
Bearing in mind what has been said above about the precariousness of the public 
sphere even in its heartlands, let us track Habermas (1999) in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society 
on the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of production of his public 
sphere. This sifting will suggest that it is not Habermas’ political public sphere but 
rather his literary public sphere that is of interest for Lima and the Mercurio Peruano. 
Habermas’ account of the European bourgeois political public sphere of the 
eighteenth century binds its emergence to the shift from the rule of feudal lords to the 
dominance of the nation-state. Politically speaking, the separation of the private and the 
public spheres which defines Habermas’ public sphere in the modern sense occurs with 
the nation-state. If the notion of ‘private’ came to signal that which was excluded from 
the state sphere, the term ‘public’ mutated to designate all things associated with the 
state. This public sphere of the nation-state was different from the sphere of the 
sovereign. It develops, under absolutism, ‘into an entity having an objective existence 
over against the person of the ruler’ (Habermas 1999, 11), the clearest indication of the 
difference being the separation of the public budget from the sovereign’s private 
holdings. The public purse funds a permanent administration and standing army, which 
become public institutions separate from the private sphere of the court. In short, 
Habermas’ modern European public sphere belongs to the world of the modern nation-
state. 
Political change does not occur in isolation, however, and may not even be the 
principal force behind the public sphere, as Habermas conceives it. That role arguably 
goes to the economic conditions of production. From the thirteenth century onwards, ‘a 
far-reaching network of horizontal economic dependencies’ (15) is built up in Europe 
through early finance and capitalist long-distance trade. Activities and dependencies 
once confined to the household are now oriented towards an expanded commodity 
market and coalesce to form the public sphere of civil society. For Habermas, a decisive 
factor in the birth of the European public sphere of civil society is the advent of a 
commodity exchange economy largely emancipated from government control. 
This new economic order entails social change. The liberalised market ‘made 
affairs in the sphere of social reproduction as much as possible a matter of private 
people left to themselves and so finally completed the privatization of civil society’ 
(74). In other words, the new order involves new social actors relatively emancipated in 
their work from government control. A new stratum of ‘bourgeois’ people, comprising 
jurists, doctors, pastors, scholars, schoolteachers and scribes, arises alongside the 
apparatus of the modern state.4 This bourgeois sphere of civil society adopts a particular 
attitude towards the public political authorities mentioned above. The existence of state 
authorities standing over this new, bourgeois group evokes awareness among its 
members of their status as opponents of the state who yet should have a say in its 
running. The new public civil society thus develops as this group comes to believe that 
concern for civil society is no longer confined to the authorities but is rightfully theirs 
too (23). The public sphere results from, and produces, an altered social order and a new 
social actor. 
Here, in sum, is the canonical Habermasian theme of people’s public use of their 
reason: 
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private 
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated 
from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate 
over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly 
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this 
political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s 
public use of their reason (öffentliches Räsonnement). (27) 
 
As Calhoun (1992, 4) observes, Habermas’ two-sided category of the public sphere has 
to do with the quantity as much as the quality of rational-critical debate, by which is 
meant its availability to as many people as possible. 
Finally, Habermas singles out Great Britain as the first and perhaps best example of 
the public sphere of civil society. Three events in 1694 and 1695 mark its birth. Firstly, 
the establishment of parliamentary government. Secondly, the founding of the Bank of 
England to provide fiscal consolidation to a system up to that point held together by 
commerce. Finally, the elimination of censorship, which allowed for an ‘influx’ of 
rational-critical arguments into the press (perhaps it would be better to say: allowed for 
an influx of more challenging rational-critical arguments, since rational-critical 
arguments are as old as language). This influx, Habermas says, allowed the press to 
evolve into an instrument capable of bringing political decisions ‘before the new forum 
of the public’ (58).  
Herein Habermas’ legacy, sifted. The second half of the book, we repeat, will argue 
that the European public sphere is not a legacy fully accepted in the present and 
jealously guarded by the continent, but remains instead a legacy to come. One day 
Europe, too, might receive its own legacy. 
Lima and a literary public sphere  
The differences between Habermas’ eighteenth-century blueprint of the European 
political public sphere and the situation of late colonial Peru are predictably stark. A 
colony, rather than a nation-state, with no parliamentary government. No fiscal 
autonomy from Spain. No independent network of commercial dependencies (only a 
trade monopoly by Spain). A social order structured according to ancien régime estates, 
with sharp ethnic divisions between indians, mestizos and those of European descent, 
and pronounced social divisions, worsened under Bourbon rule, between creoles and 
European Spaniards. Censorship in cultural matters. In short, the Habermasian 
ingredients of an independent political public sphere of civil society were absent from 
Lima in 1791. 
And yet such a conclusion risks missing the point. By Habermas’ own reckoning, 
almost no country, with the exception of Great Britain and perhaps France, had a 
political public sphere by 1791. What many did have is what Habermas calls the 
precursor to the political public sphere, namely, the literary public sphere. The literary 
public sphere ‘provided the training ground for a critical public reflection […] of private 
people focusing on the genuine experiences of their novel privateness’ (29). In the 
reading room and theatre, in museums and concert halls, individuals laid claim to 
culture ‘as the ready topic of a discussion through which an audience-oriented 
(publikumsbezogen) subjectivity communicated with itself’ (29). Not, according to 
Habermas, ‘autochthonously bourgeois’, this public sphere in the world of letters was 
born when  a group comprising largely the educated middle class (including women) 
but also servants and apprentices learned the art of critical-rational public debate 
through its contact with court society and displayed it in the coffee houses, salons and 
Tischgesellschaften (table societies) of the town. 
The hybrid character of this literary public sphere resonates with the case of Lima 
and the Mercurio Peruano. Archival work done by Jean-Pierre Clément (1997, 34) 
categorises the anonymous contributors to the periodical as follows: ‘intellectuals’ 
(24%), public administrators (18%), professionals ‘con actividades económicas’ (15%),  
clergy (14%),  military (4%), unknown (25%). These individuals form part of a colonial 
middle class marked by absolutism and court society: 
Lo más importante […] es la naturaleza económico-social del grupo dominante en 
la colonia… y en el Mercurio Peruano, grupo al que se puede aplicar, pensamos, el 
calificativo de burgués. Es cierto que esta población, a pesar de tener actividades 
‘burguesas’ (el comercio, por ejemplo), manifiesta con gran frecuencia tendencias 
aristocráticas como la compra de títulos nobiliarios o una aspiración vehemente a 
las condecoraciones y a los hábitos de órdenes de caballería. Pero es éste un rasgo 
que caracteriza a todas las burguesías nacionales de fines del siglo XVIII. (Clément 
1997, 87-88) 
Inoperable without ‘estrechos vínculos con el poder virreinal’ (Poupeney-Hart 2009, 
175), the Mercurio is also economically dependent on authority figures. Its subscribers 
include a Viceroy, a Regent, ten Oidores, four Alcaldes, two Fiscales and one 
Archbishop. Later on in its first year of publication, the Mercurio renews its vote of 
thanks to such ‘ilustres personajes’ in suitably ancien régime style: 
La alta proteccion de los Gefes superiores no ha discontinuado en nuestro fomento, 
el que hemos logrado igualmente de los mas ilustres personajes del Reyno. Con 
placer nos extenderíamos en descubrir nuestra gratitud á un esclarecido Prelado 
cuyas sabias producciones han honrado tanto á nuestro Periódico […]. 
(‘Introduccion’, 1 September 1791, III, 321-322)5 
 
And yet, the same piece immediately recalls its ‘sacred’ obligation to another 
master, to a different authority, namely, the public: ‘Obligados á seguirlas con 
puntualidad, renovamos los sagrados empeños contraídos con el Público, dedicándonos 
á completar el resto del año con el mismo esmero con que hemos trabajado los 
anteriores meses.’ Articulated from within an ancien régime rhetorical apparatus, these 
words nevertheless invoke a different court: the court of public opinion. And for all its 
dependence on viceregal connections, the Mercurio is an example of a private 
commercial network, based on subscriptions of 14 reales a month or on single 
purchases by private individuals. At its height the periodical had 517 subscribers (that is 
more than the Correo de Madrid), 46% of whom Clément classifies as belonging to the 
Third Estate.6 Clément’s (64) estimate is that the Mercurio may have achieved a 
readership-cum-‘listenership’ of between 4,500 and 5,400 people. While Lima, 1791, 
neither constitutes a democratic milieu nor hosts a fully-fledged network of bourgeois 
commercial ties, city and periodical are no strangers to either phenomenon. Indeed, it 
was more common in the colonies than in the metropolis for nobles to be engaged in 
commerce, such was the need to distinguish themselves from indians (Clément, 75). 
The status of the periodical is less clear, ironically, in the sphere of culture. As soon 
as we turn its pages does it not become glaringly apparent that the Mercurio cannot but 
fail Habermas’ censorship test? Do not its contents immediately signal its affiliation to 
the ancien régime, its ‘sacred obligations’ tie it straight back to a traditional Catholic as 
much as monarchical order, and its general contours reinforce rather than undermine the 
conventional idea that the eighteenth-century Hispanic public sphere, such as it is, is the 
most uncritical, therefore the most unpublic, public sphere imaginable? If, as we 
suspect, the public sphere is really Habermas’ name for the site of Enlightenment, this 
view of an unpublic Hispanic public sphere amounts to a familiar claim, which is also a 
Habermasian claim: namely, that since Enlightenment is essentially opposed to religion 
(concesso non dato), then the most religious parts of the world, such as the Hispanic 
parts of the world which had long been part of a much older, Catholic sphere, the 
communitas christianae, are necessarily the most inimical to Enlightenment.7 An 
analysis of the Mercurio Peruano as the arm of a ‘Catholic’ Enlightenment will have to 
wait for another occasion. For now, let us pursue only the narrower, Habermasian issue 
of censorship, since the presence of censorship would appear in and of itself to negate 
the possibility of an eighteenth-century Lima literary public sphere. 
The Mercurio Peruano and the censorship question 
In an article from 3 November 1791, ‘Progresos del Papel Periodico que se publica en 
Santa-Fe de Bogotá, anunciado en el Mercurio Peruano. Tomo 1. pag. 306.’, the 
Mercurio conjures the institution most synonymous with the image of a benighted 
Hispanic Catholic world: the Inquisition. The subtext of the piece is censorship. 
Commenting on a new periodical paper in Santa Fe de Bogotá, the Mercurio’s reference 
to the Inquisition comes in a meditation on the need to distance oneself from public 
opinion. This is a common and entirely logical theme in the Mercurio: it is the task of 
the Enlightened not always to represent public opinion, but rather to diverge from it and 
in the process forge a more informed one. The periodical then introduces the related 
point of censorship. Philosophy, it says, should not be separated from the ‘sagradas 
máximas de la Religion’.8 A true ‘Filósofo’ is no libertine or fanatic, enemy of truth and 
reason, as many mistakenly believe (the piece is written barely two years after the 
French Revolution), but one who uses philosophy in the service of collective happiness 
(la felicidad comun). But what happens, it asks, when the true philosopher’s efforts are 
discredited by the very society he strives to help? Surrounded by such 
misunderstanding, it is all the more necessary to celebrate the arrival of another 
instrument of enlightenment . The Mercurio then details some of the new periodical’s 
criticisms of New Granada. It should not surprise us, the Mercurio says, that some self-
interested souls uncomfortable with truth should object to such criticisms. Nor that the 
prejudiced, ignorant vulgo—a term that elsewhere does not just designate the low-
born—should resist the truth. 9 In truth, it continues, if one wanted to please the 
multitude it would frequently be necessary to adopt ideas that go against true reason (la 
recta razon). The implication here is that one should be careful about public opinion. A 
critical opinion, the Mercurio insinuates, must in certain respects be resolutely unpublic, 
that is, not conform to public opinion, and certainly not always please the vulgo (which, 
we repeat, does not just mean the low-born). 
But the real import of this meditation is revealed in a footnote on the recent 
censorship by the Inquisition of five European periodical papers. The Mercurio wants to 
make its own position plain (in truth, it never has just one position): 
El Gobierno, y el Tribunal de la fe jamas olvidan la solicitud de reprimir las 
producciones relativamente nocivas á la Religion, y al Estado. Baxo de la 
proteccion del primero, y en la esperanza de no merecer la censura del segundo, se 
han dado á luz, corren, y correrán nuestros Periodicos sin desviarse del principal 
objeto para que fueron establecidos. (II, 169) 
 
The Mercurio respects government and the Inquisition, will seek protection from the 
former and try not to be censored by the latter, but will do all this without deviating 
from the main goal for which it was established. This is no vow of silence and does not 
amount to refusing to take sides in public debate. The new periodical, it continues, will 
have the ‘buenos y sensatos’ on its side, while those who criticise it will recognise 
themselves in the defects it highlights. However, without declaring what its principal 
objeto is (anyone who has read the periodical knows it to be: the Enlightenment of 
Peru), the writer is tentatively articulating what the Mercurio is not principally 
concerned with, namely, the official politics of the viceroyalty, which it will leave to the 
public authorities and to gacetas.10 
In the continuation to the article, ‘Concluye el Discurso Antecedente’ (6 
November), the Mercurio takes its distance from periodicals, such as its new, sister 
paper in Santa Fe, which is happy to pass judgement on the recent peace between Spain 
and Great Britain (which it thinks will be short-lived and offer few benefits to 
Spaniards). Bearing in mind what has been said in the earlier edition about censorship 
and the Inquisition, the Mercurio’s response is telling: ‘Repetimos que la imparcialidad 
y la moderacion hacen el carácter de nuestras producciones: y con este no es compatible 
ese espíritu audaz que osa citar á un temerario exâmen las determinaciones de los 
Gabinetes’ (173). Impartiality and moderation characterise what we write. It is a clear 
statement of the need to steer clear of formal politics. In Habermasian terms, it is the 
negation of a political public sphere. 
The position adopted by the Mercurio was articulated on 3 November (true 
philosophers are neither libertines nor fanatics but use their ‘lights’ for communal 
happiness) and is underscored in the final point of its résumé of the discourses offered 
by Santa Fe: ‘los verdaderos derechos de la libertad del hombre, ennoblecidos, y 
conservados baxo el suave yugo de una legitima subordinacion y dependencia’ (166). 
The rights of the freedoms of man are ennobled and preserved under the gentle yoke of 
a legitimate subordination, viz. to the public and spiritual authorities. Now, what cannot 
be determined absolutely from the above is whether the Mercurio’s statement of 6 
November is a statement of belief (we believe periodicals, as opposed to gacetas, 
should not dissent from either the public or spiritual authorities), of tactical necessity 
(we had better believe it) or of a double consciousness (we believe we believe it, but we 
also believe in certain other things that might not coincide with the government’s or the 
Inquisition’s understanding of ‘legitimate subordination’). 
 However, above and beyond attempts to reconstruct the intended meaning of the 
term ‘subordination’ in this context, and before concluding hastily that this is merely the 
expression of a willingness to self-censor political opinions in an act of subordination to 
Crown and Church, confirming in the process Whitaker’s (1961, 5-6) view that the 
Hispanic Enlightenment was not about politics but rather practical problem-solving, it is 
worth considering the Mercurio’s principal objeto invoked above. It is the difference 
between Habermas’ political public sphere and a literary public sphere, a difference that 
belongs also to the internal history of the printed press (to the distinction between 
gacetas and periódicos). 
Mercurial reason 
 The principal objeto of the Mercurio Peruano would appear to be the 
Enlightenment of Peru. Enlightenment as instruction or making free from prejudice, and 
Enlightenment as shedding light on, making luminous (OED). The first edition, of 2 
January 1791, begins thus: ‘El principal objeto de este Papel Periodico, segun el 
anuncio que se anticipó en su Prospecto, es hacer mas conocido el País que habitamos, 
este Pais contra el qual los Autores extrangeros han publicado tantos paralogismos.’11 
Porras Barrenechea (1974, 133) writes of the Mercurio’s desire to illuminate ‘el suelo y 
la historia de la patria en gestación’. To illuminate the suelo, the Mercurio carries 
articles on the grand themes of commerce, education, mining, and intellectual 
discoveries, as well as on the smaller ones, such as machinery to alleviate the work done 
by blacks on cacao (13 February), the dearth of women among the periodical’s 
subscribers (27 February), black slave congregations (16 June), music in the theatre (20 
October), the yaraví (22 December), and the Bishop of Quito’s edict on a new road (29 
December). In one single issue, 2 February 1791, the Mercurio comments on the Lima 
population, free trade, cafés, hairdressers, the standard of living of the average person in 
Lima (they are better off these days), and the fact that Lima has more hospitals and 
schools than does Madrid. All of this, it says, is testament to the triumph of 
Enlightenment (Ilustración) (in truth, the picture is not so rosy, which is why the 
Mercurio spends its time calling for Enlightenment rather than celebrating it).  
 As important as the present territory is its past history. The Mercurio is not so 
much bringing the Enlightenment to Peru (as though all the elements of enlightenment, 
such as reason, experience, observation, thought, etc, came from outside) as constituting 
a Peruvian Enlightenment. Having illuminated its present, it remains, then, to furnish 
the territory with a history. This is achieved by working through a local, Peruvian 
pantheon of thinkers such as Llano Zapata and institutions such as the Real Casa 
Hospital de Niños Expósitos de Nuestra Señora de Atocha and the Colegio of San 
Marcos. Then there is a more delicate matter for creoles. How to provide the suelo with 
a distinctive historia so that it may be a patria distinct from Spain? The single, most 
distinctive historical marker of difference from Spain is the region’s indian past. It is 
clear from the comparative dearth of articles on indian matters that the subject is a 
dangerous one for creoles (praise the past too much and one hands legitimacy to the 
indians). Present-day indians remained an awkward subject, often a source of 
embarrassment, for contributors. Less so the Incas. The Mercurio could make the 
indians’ Inca forebears into the creoles’ ancestors, that is to say, into the ancestors of 
the patria.12 And a patria with a distinctive—glorious, imperial—past is nothing less 
than a nación. Contributors to the Mercurio manage variously to call the territory 
‘Peru’, ‘Nacion’, ‘pais’, ‘patria’, ‘República’, and even ‘Imperio Peruano’ (28 April, 7 
August). 
 The simple point is this: the Mercurio Peruano does not appear to challenge or 
even to bring ‘before the new forum of the public’ (Habermas) ‘las determinaciones de 
los Gabinetes’ (that is for gacetas). But it does something arguably more political. It 
attempts to constitute a dramatic new forum. The Mercurio does not just report on an 
Enlightened patria, but rather attempts to construct—with all its blindspots—an 
Enlightened nación through the very act of sharing knowledge in the public sphere 
which it is in turn striving to configure. To return to what was said earlier: no doubt 
political, economic, social and cultural factors help foster the conditions of production 
necessary for a public sphere. But an exclusively contextualist explanation elides the 
particular productive force of the act and actor of critical reason in the formation of the 
new context. 
 We are close here to François-Xavier Guerra’s (2009) thesis on the new form of 
sociability, associationism, which, he claims, enters the Hispanic world with modernity. 
Not without its problems, Guerra’s ‘strong’ reading holds that most social and political 
theories in the Spanish-speaking world up until the eighteenth century were based on an 
imaginary that took society to be structured by groups or corps—the traditional 
Hispanic ‘sociedad estamental’. In this traditional order, the ties of social actors do not 
depend on the will of the individual but rather on birth into a particular class, pueblo or 
ethnic group. Individual will, such as it is, is subordinated to the will of the corporate 
body or estate. According to Guerra, this is not the case in modernity. Modernity knows 
associations of individuals—and this is the key point—whose legitimacy comes from 
association itself, that is, from the will of associates. Guerra (113) calls it the ‘invention 
of the individual’. And he sees clearly—and this is one of his greatest insights—the 
profound kinship between the absolutist imaginary and the Enlightenment (and even 
revolutionary) imaginary that runs parallel to it. Both absolutism and Enlightenment 
share hostility towards corporate bodies and their privileges, and both, albeit for 
different reasons, make the individual into the normative subject of institutions and 
values. Notwithstanding certain irreducible problems with the archetypes at the root of 
Guerra’s thesis (rather than say that a sociability of knowledge is exclusive to modern 
times, and therefore alien to Hispanic cultures―because, according to the archetype, 
the pre-modern, corporatist Hispanic world shares none of the material or symbolic 
resources of the modern, individualistic world—it might be precisely more reasonable 
to say that it is more dominant in modern times), Guerra nonetheless draws us to the 
following possibility: that in the Sociedad Académica de Amantes de Lima that 
underpinned the Mercurio Peruano people came together (certain creoles and 
peninsulares came together), theoretically at least, as free individuals. ‘Sociedad 
estamental’, yes; but in one space at least, Sociedad Académica. No association without 
the will of the associates qua independent critical participants.13  
 Did the members of the Sociedad think their association responded to a different 
form of sociability? I am not sure. We have only hints. In the ‘Prospecto’ (I, xi), Don 
Jacinto Calero y Moreira writes that there are times when the markers of distinction are 
appropriate (he has just listed the great and the good who are the periodical’s 
subscribers), but not here. Here, he writes, the appropriate word is Conciudadanos, 
citizens. And ‘Philosophy’, to quote from a later edition, is the name of that knowledge 
that best fits the ethos of association: ‘Filosofía: […] esa sublime virtud, cuyo objeto 
primitivo es la union y recíproco amor de los hombres, vinculándolos por el 
conocimiento de la dependencia en que mutuamente los constituye la opinion, y la 
necesidad’ (‘Nuevos establecimientos de buen gusto’, 26 May, II, 66). This is a petition 
for the autonomous power of knowledge and commerce. Men are bound together (though 
possible to read in the neutral form, as ‘humankind’, the subjects are almost always 
male), not by virtue of the sovereign’s will and not even by any social pact, but by 
economic need and a philosophical activity in the doing of which they learn of the 
dependencies involved in knowledge (opinion). There is another hint of this same idea in 
the great ‘dissertation’ on the history of commerce in Peru that runs across eight issues 
and invokes the social and political ties (enlazes sociales y politicos) which only 
commerce can provide ‘Modernas Naciones’ with—it being understood that commercial 
ties are the equivalent of the philosophical ties that bind the members of an association 
into a different sociability.14 But we shall end with the idea’s appearance in a locus 
classicus of the literary public sphere, the eighteenth-century café. 
 ‘Rasgo histórico y filosófico sobre los cafées de Lima’ (10 February 1791) is a 
good example of the Mercurio’s patriotic empiricist historiography, committed to 
rescuing the ordinary and the abject from, as it puts it elsewhere, all those systematising 
histories and geographies of the country compiled ‘en las orillas del Sena, y del 
Támesis’.15 It is in the ordinary fragments of the patria, despised by foreign scholars, 
that one can divine ‘the civil system’.The piece recalls how cafés in Spain were 
originally built on top of Alogerías and that coffee first came into Spain with the Arabs, 
along with a fragment of the Arabic language, the word cafée coming from cahué (in 
fact, originally qahwa). These useful houses first put down roots in Lima in 1771, before 
which there was no public café, partly because mate, owing to the care and time needed 
to prepare and consume it, was not compatible with the publicness (publicidad) of a 
shop. The first Lima café was established by Don Francisco Serio in Calle de Santo 
Domingo. The second followed a year later. Earnings from the cafés are thought to be 
considerable. Now there are six of them—many with billiards and truco tables, all selling 
iced drinks and other beverages and most being especially busy first thing in the morning 
and at siesta time. 
Three things merit attention in respect of the question of the public sphere. 1) First, 
the ‘civil system’. Here is not the place to dwell at any length on this theme. Let us just 
say that, despite the presence in the piece of certain traditional Catholic topoi, the writer 
ultimately attributes the founding of establishments of the polis such as cafés to the 
sistema civil de la República (again this is clearly a creole, as opposed to indigenous, 
project). Empirical study of cafés will reveal not the hand of God or even of the 
monarchy so much as the hand of the civil system. 2) Second, authority. The article 
both reminds us of the ancien-régime dimensions of Lima and gestures to a newer, more 
egalitarian order, the order of reason. On the one hand, its writer pays conventional 
homage to the representative of the ancien régime: ‘El Excelentísimo Señor Don 
Manuel de Amat Virrey entonces de estos Reynos, no se opuso a estos establecimientos, 
conociendo que su plantificacion y fomento cedia directamente en beneficio de la 
Sociedad’. Moreover, café gatherings exhibit only the most decorous behaviour: ‘las 
concurrencias de los Cafées’ are ‘practicadas con aquella moderacion, decencia y 
honestidad que son características del genio Peruano’. In translation: cafés will not 
disturb the existing order. On the other hand, however, these same concurrencias point 
to a different order of things, to other, more horizontal relationships between men. The 
Viceroy himself, the writer claims, would like such concurrencias to unite man with 
man, to develop a uniformity of character among men, and even to increase the 
circulation of goods and thereby contribute to the comfort of locals and to providing 
them with an innocent diversion:  
como quiera que las concurrencias, practicadas con aquella moderacion, decencia y 
honestidad que son características del genio Peruano, unen el hombre al hombre, 
concilian la uniformidad del caracter, aumentan la circulacion y los recursos de 
subsistencia, contribuyen a la comodidad de los vecinos, y les proporcionan un 
recreo inocente. Tambien la Ciudad no miró con repugnancia la introduccion de 
esta moda. (I, 110) 
This is the classic Enlightenment theme, with added mate and local street names, of 
cafés as the site of a new form of would-be egalitarian sociability based on reason. 
3) Third and finally, there is the question of the publicness of the reason of the 
public sphere. What, the writer says, will those critics who want the Mercurio to be 
merely a vehicle of adulation or a publiciser of private feelings (sentimientos privados) 
say of this account of Lima’s cafés? He does not care. We do not write, he writes, just 
for the capital, or for the year 1791, but work for everyone and for posterity (para la 
noticia de todo el mundo, y para la posteridad). To that end it just might be that one 
day, in this or in the other hemisphere, news of the cafés of Lima is appreciated more 
than the oft-repeated accounts of wars, conquest and settlement (fundacion). Two 
themes intertwine here. First, the periodical confines itself neither to the private sphere 
of private feelings nor to the official—honourific-adulatory—discourse of the state 
sphere; rather, it is implied, it mixes the two spheres. This crossing of the private and 
the public coincides with Habermas’ definition of the public sphere of civil society. 
Precisely in support of such a crossing, future historians, the author writes, will use 
cafés (rather than the grand affairs of state) as material with which to write the history 
of the capital, the history of how it thought and of how it began to emulate and even 
surpass (sobrepujar) the coffee houses of Europe. All of which means, of course: as 
material testifying to the greatness of the sistema civil de la República. Secondly, and as 
hinted at earlier, agents of what we have been calling the literary public sphere must 
necessarily countenance the possibility that their public works might always be 
unpublic, that is, not quite correspond to the majority view of the public sphere in its 
present configuration.16 The true dimensions of their reason may only be recognised at a 
later time, the time of la posteridad. This reminds us that the (literary) public sphere is 
neither truly public nor truly spherical but always taking shape.  
Conclusion  
The presence and nature of the Mercurio Peruano in Lima in 1791 suggests a ‘sphere of 
private people come together as a public’ and hints that concern not just over public 
affairs but over the very status of the patria was ‘no longer confined to the authorities 
but was considered by the subjects as one that was properly theirs’. On occasion—and 
we must be clear about this—patriotic historiography in the Mercurio is 
indistinguishable from the most traditional discourse of Empire.17 At other times, 
however, even when the highbrow style of the Mercurio seems to reinforce another 
traditional civilising mission, namely, the High Literary civilising mission of creole and 
peninsular elites, the Mercurio shared (its) critical reason. Doubtless certain local and 
transatlantic political, economic, social and cultural conditions made possible the 
configuration of a Peruvian literary public sphere of sorts. But the latter was also made 
possible by this (heterogeneous) critical reason. Here was an instrument not just 
bringing news of the polis ‘before the new forum of the public’, as though the public 
already existed as an empirical subject before and in advance of all articulations of it, 
but rather endeavouring to constitute a public. In this delicate, always incomplete public 
sphere we encounter two further possibilities. First, an altered understanding of 
‘modernity’ in the colonies: an uncertain, contradictory modernity (emancipatory and 
exclusive) at work before the official founding of the nation-state, taking shape in close 
proximity to the forms and functions of the ancien régime, and moving, like quicksilver, 
in the interstices of formal politics. Second, and going beyond Guerra, the possibility 
that in the exercise of critical reason what is called Enlightened modernity, with all its 
blindspots, has always already been under way. This is another way of saying that 
critical reason has always already been producing the conditions of and for the (literary) 
public sphere. 
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1 I am grateful to David Jiménez Torres and Leticia Villamediana González for the opportunity 
to deliver an early version of this article at the conference ‘The Configuration of the 
Spanish Public Sphere: 18th-21st Centuries’, University of Warwick, June 2015.  
2 Poupeney-Hart (2010, 26) writes of ‘la consolidación de una esfera pública’. Poupeney-Hart 
(2009) argues elsewhere that scholars have downplayed the variety of voices in the 
Mercurio, turning it into an exclusive matter of Peruvian national identity. For the link 
between associationism and the modern public sphere, see Guerra (2009). 
3 For criticisms that Habermas exaggerated the bourgeois and emancipatory nature of the 
concept, see Cahoun (1992, 4, 39). Habermas (1992, 425, 442) acknowledges both 
charges. For criticism of his blindspot on religion, Calhoun (1992, 36). For a more 
negative Frankfurt School view of the Enlightenment legacy, see Adorno and Horkheimer 
(1997). 
4 See Habermas (1999, 23) on the downward mobility of the ‘genuine “burghers,” the old 
occupational orders of craftsmen and shopkeepers’. 
5 All references to the Mercurio Peruano are to one of the three volumes (I, II or III) that collect 
together editions from the year 1791, available in digitized form through the Biblioteca 
Virtual Miguel de Cervantes. These volumes are from the facsimilar edition published by 
the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Lima, 1964. I have kept the original punctuation.  
                                                                                                                                               
6 Clément (73; see also 76-77) details the social composition of subscribers as 46.3% 
commoners or Third Estate (estado llano), 35.1% nobles, 16.3% clergy, 2.3% unknown. 
7 This view of the lack of Enlightenment in the Hispanic world has been much challenged in 
recent times (see Saldaña 2006, Paquette 2008, Safier 2008, Stolley 2013, the essays in 
Astigarraga 2015). Sifting carefully through the debate, it seems that some of the 
challenges are really objections, not to the claim that the Hispanic world did not have an 
Enlightenment (a claim seldom heard), but to the under-representation of the Hispanic 
Enlightenment in general scholarship (Jonathan Israel has been particularly singled out in 
this respect). The key issue is not whether Spain and the colonies had an Enlightenment 
(the essays in Whitaker 1942 answered that question in the affirmative decades ago, 
though not before the Mercurio Peruano had) but whether or not aspects or practitioners 
of a Hispanic Enlightenment were in the vanguard of the Enlightenment in general, such 
that they should figure in general scholarship on the Enlightenment. One of the ways of 
revalorising the Hispanic Enlightenment is to challenge the ‘blueprint’ of the 
Enlightenment, especially the view that it was essentilly opposed to religion. Cassirer 
(2009) did this briiliantly for the Enlightenment as a whole in 1932; Whitaker’s volume 
did it for a Hispanic ‘Catholic’ Enlightenment in 1942. Contemporary critics, such as 
Cañizares-Esguerra (2001), have often been noisier but less successful (because more 
contradictory) in this regard. See Lehner (2016) for a recent contribution to the question of 
a Catholic Enlightenment. I should like to thank both assessors for helpful comments and 
bibliographical suggestions. 
8 The same idea appeared two months earlier, on 1 September 1791 (III, 318-319). 
9 ‘El vulgo (¡á quantos grandes, graves, y ricos comprehende esta denominacion!’ (‘Rasgo 
histórico y filosófico sobre los cafées de Lima’, 10 February 1791, I, 109). 
10 On the generic difference between gacetas (dedicated to political news) and periódicos 
(reserved for commentary on ‘literary’ or scientific matters), see Poupeney-Hart (2010, 
19).  
11 A paradigmatic statement of Enlightenment values is to be found in ‘Historia de la Fundacion, 
Progresos, y Actual Estado de la Real Universidad de San Marcos de Lima’, 7 July 1791 (II). 
12 See the editions of 30 January (I), 2 and 6 October (III) and 11 December (III) on present-day 
indians; and 17 March (I), 4 August (II), and above all the 21 and 25 August (II), on the 
Incas. 
13 Habermas (36) writes of the Tischgesellschaften, salons, and coffee houses of Europe that, in 
principle (he is not oblivious to the rapid re-imposition of hierarchy that was often the 
                                                                                                                                               
reality), they ‘preserved a kind of institutional intercourse that, far from presupposing the 
equality of status, disregarded status altogether.’ 
14 ‘Disertacion Histórica y Política sobre el Comercio del Perú’, 20 March 1791 (I, 209). 
15 ‘Idea general del Perú’, 2 January 1791 (I, 1). This is from the opening page of the first article 
of the first edition. 
16 ‘Si quitasemos á nuestras acciones, y aun á nuestras ciencias todo lo que se dirige por pura 
opinion, conoceriamos quan fútil es la mayor parte de ellas’ (13 February, I, 116). 
17 See ‘Historia de las Misiones de Caxamarquilla’ (30 June, II) on the civilising mission of the 
Conquest. 
